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Abstract 
We use a structural VAR with sign restrictions to jointly identify the impact of monetary 
policy, private absorption, technology and oil price shocks on current account 
fluctuations in the U.S.. We derive the sign restrictions from theoretical impulse response 
functions of a DSGE model with oil, ensuring that these are consistent with a broad range 
of parameter values. We find that a contractionary oil price shock has a negative effect on 
the current account which lasts for approximately 3 years. We also find that monetary 
policy shocks and private absorption shocks are the main drivers of historical current 
account deteriorations in the U.S. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks can explain 
approximately 60 percent at a one year forecast horizon, although this reduces to around 
40 per cent at a 7 year horizon, whilst the oil price explains just under 10 percent of the 
forecast error variance of the U.S. current account. 
Keywords: Current Account, Global Imbalances, Sign Restrictions 
JEL Classification: E0, F32, F4 5
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Non-Technical Summary
External imbalances are a central theme in international economics and a powerful driver
of change in economic history. Under the gold standard, trade balance adjustments were
typically very slow and costly for countries with current account de￿cits, leading to a search
for alternatives. During the interwar period, widening imbalances ended in a dismantling
of international free trade and monetary arrangements, adding to the geopolitical tensions
in the run-up to World War II. The 1970s were marked by a signi￿cant rise in the oil
price and thus by a terms of trade shock which led to a net transfer of resources from
oil importing countries to oil producers. In the decade that followed, the continuation
of widening current account positions triggered intensive international coordination with
concrete policy commitments under the G7 Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) agreements
that focused on exchange rates. In the 1990s, external imbalances in emerging economies
became a key source of concern particularly since ￿nancial crises hit most large emerging
economies.
In the 21st Century, the world again faces large, even unprecedented, external imbal-
ances. Aggregate current account positions as a share of global output are twice as large
as they were in the mid-1980s when current account imbalances were at their highest ever.
One of the main contributors to these developments has been the United States. In partic-
ular, from a nearly balanced position at the beginning of the 1990s, by 2006 the US current
account de￿cit had increased to above 6 percent of US GDP. This has spurred an intense
debate in academic and policy circles about the drivers of the US current account de￿cit by
focusing in particular on the role of a handful of potential culprits, namely a surge in US
private absorption, a rise in US government spending, loose monetary policy, the substantial
increase in oil prices, as well as strong total factor productivity growth.
In this paper, we use a structural VAR with sign restrictions to jointly identify the
impact of monetary policy, private absorption, productivity and oil price shocks on current
account ￿ uctuations in the US. We derive the sign restrictions from theoretical impulse
response functions of a DSGE model with oil, ensuring that these are consistent with a
broad range of structural parameter values.
The results indicate that contractionary oil price shocks have a negative e⁄ect on the
current account which lasts for approximately 3 years. However, the surge in oil prices
cannot entirely explain the deterioration of the US current account de￿cit, in the recent
years. Considering forecast error decompositions, the results imply that monetary policy
shocks explain cc. 60 percent of the forecast error variance of the US current account
at a one year forecast horizon, although this reduces to around 40 per cent at a 7 year
horizon, whilst the oil price shock explains just under 10 percent. In order to assess the
relative importance of all disturbances on the current account and how this has evolved
over time, we also conduct a historical decomposition based on our VAR speci￿cation for
the US current account. The results also con￿rm the importance of expansionary monetary
policy, as well as of private absorption shocks for US current account ￿ uctuations.6
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1 Introduction
External imbalances are a central theme in international economics and a powerful driver
of change in economic history. Under the gold standard, trade balance adjustments were
typically very slow and costly for countries with current account de￿cits, leading to a search
for alternatives. During the interwar period, widening imbalances ended in a dismantling
of international free trade and monetary arrangements, adding to the geopolitical tensions
in the run-up to World War II. The 1970s were marked by a signi￿cant rise in the oil
price and thus by a terms of trade shock which led to a net transfer of resources from
oil importing countries to oil producers. In the decade that followed, the continuation
of widening current account positions triggered intensive international coordination with
concrete policy commitments under the G7 Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) agreements
that focused on exchange rates. In the 1990s, external imbalances in emerging economies
became a key source of concern particularly since ￿nancial crises hit most large emerging
economies.
In the 21st Century, the world again faces large, even unprecedented, external imbal-
ances. Aggregate current account positions as a share of global output are twice as large
as they were in the mid-1980s when current account imbalances were at their highest ever.
One of the main contributors to these developments has been the US In particular, from
a nearly balanced position at the beginning of the 1990s, by 2006 the US current account
de￿cit had increased to above 6 percent of US GDP. This has spurred an intense debate in
academic and policy circles about the drivers of the US current account de￿cit, with policy
focus in particular on the role of a handful of potential culprits, namely a surge in US pri-
vate absorption, a rise in US government spending, loose monetary policy, the substantial
increase in oil prices, as well as strong total factor productivity growth1.
There is also a growing empirical academic literature, which aims at identifying the
drivers of the US current account deterioration. Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007), for ex-
ample, attribute the ￿ uctuations in the US external position, using a VAR with long-run
restrictions, mainly to supply shocks driven by improvements in total factor productiv-
ity. They also found that policy shocks, both ￿scal and monetary, were less important.
Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007), on the other hand, argue that a surge in asset prices,
both in real estate and equity markets, has been the main determinant of US current ac-
count ￿ uctuations. Further to these, several empirical papers have looked at the impact
of oil-price shocks on domestic macroeconomic aggregates in the US (Hamilton, 1993 and
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 2004) and in particular at how the e⁄ect of oil price changes
a⁄ected business cycle ￿ uctuations (Hooker, 2002, Hamilton, 2005, Lippi and Nobili, 2007,
Blanchard and Gali, 2007 and Clements and Krolzig, 2002). However none of these papers
considered under the same framework the impact of oil price shocks and other real and
nominal domestic shocks on current account ￿ uctuations.
In this paper, we use a structural VAR with sign restrictions to jointly identify the
impact of monetary policy, private absorption, technology and oil price shocks on current
account ￿ uctuations in the US We derive the sign restrictions from theoretical impulse
response functions of a DSGE model with oil, ensuring that these are consistent with a
broad range of parameter values, as they hold for a wide range of structural parameters
in our model. We ￿nd that a contractionary oil price shock has a negative e⁄ect on the
1Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007) ￿nd that for the US 1 percent increase in multi-factor productivity
leads to a deterioration of the net trade/DGP ratio of 0.5 percent. De Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005)
report a similar result when estimating a DSGE model for the US-euro area.7
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current account which lasts for approximately 3 years. Our paper shows that monetary
policy shocks and private absorption shocks are the main drivers of US current account
￿ uctuations. Furthermore, the forecast error variance decomposition ￿nds that monetary
policy shocks explain cc. 60 percent of the forecast error variance of the US current account
at a one year forecast horizon, although this reduces to around 40 per cent at a 7 year
horizon, whilst the oil price shock explains just under 10 percent.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model. In section 3, we derive the sign restrictions used later in the
empirical exercise. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy, while section 5 discusses the
impact of structural shocks on US macro variables and on the historical evolution of the
US current account. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we will present a small open economy DSGE model with oil. The model
is similar to the small open economy New-Keynesian model described in Medina and Soto
(2005) or Blanchard and Gali (2006). In particular, in contrast to the standard New-
Keynesian set-up, we assume that the economy is an oil-importer2, where oil-prices are
exogenously determined and oil is an input into the ￿nal consumption good as well as in
the production process of domestic intermediate goods.
2.1 Households
The representative household in our economy maximizes its lifetime utility by choosing


















where ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, ￿ is the inverse of the elasticity of work e⁄ort with respect to the real wage
and eb;t is a shock to preferences, sometimes also labelled as a risk premium shock, that
a⁄ects the intertemporal substitution of households. This follows an AR(1) process of the
form ln(eb;t) = (1￿￿b)ln eb +￿b ln(eb;t￿1)+"b;t . The maximization of the utility function
is subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form:
Pt Ct + Et f￿t;t+1Dt+1g = Wt Nt + Dt
where Pt is the domestic price level, Dt+1 is the nominal pay-o⁄ in period t+1 of the
portfolio held at the end of the period t, Nt denotes the labour services provided to ￿rms at
wage rate Wt. ￿t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo⁄s
relevant to the domestic household. We assume that households have access to a complete
set of contingent claims traded internationally.
The corresponding ￿rst order conditions are denoted by:
￿tPt = eb;tCt
￿￿ (2)
2The U.S., although an oil producer, is running an oil balance balance de￿cit towards the rest of the
world.8
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Combining (2) and (3), taking conditional expectations of both sides and rearranging












where Rt = 1
Et￿t;t+1 is the gross return on a riskless one-period discount bond paying o⁄
one unit of domestic currency in t + 1 with Et￿t;t+1 being its price.
2.2 International Risk-Sharing
Under the assumption of complete securities markets, a ￿rst order condition analogous to



















in a simple international risk sharing condition, which links domestic consumption and
consumption in the rest of the world.
2.3 Firms
There are three types of ￿rms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive primary-goods
￿rms indexed by f 2 [0;1], each of which produces a single tradable di⁄erentiated interme-
diate good, Yf;t, and a set of two representative ￿rms. One of these combines the purchases
of domestically-produced intermediate goods with purchases of imported intermediate goods
to form a core consumption good, while the other combines the core consumption good and
oil imports to a form a ￿nal consumption good.
2.3.1 Primary-Goods



















using hours worked, Lf;t and Oh
f;t, the quantity of oil in the production process. The
parameter ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution between labour and oil while the
variable zt represents (total-factor) productivity which is assumed to be identical across
￿rms and which evolves over time according to an exogenous serially correlated process
ln(zt) = (1 ￿ ￿z) lnz + ￿z ln(zt￿1) + "z;t, where z determines the steady-state level of pro-
ductivity. Furthermore Yf;t is used as an intermediate input using a CES technology for9
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Taking the price of oil PO;t and wages Wt as given, the ￿rm￿ s optimal demand for oil and
labour must solve the problem of minimizing total input cost Wt Nf;t +PO;t Oh
f;t subject to









Note that oil prices (in foreign currency) are exogenous in the model and follow an AR(1)
process ln(P￿
O;t) = (1 ￿ ￿po)lnP￿
O + ￿po ln(P￿
O;t￿1) + "po;t. As the law of one price holds in
the model, we have P￿
O;tSt = PO;t:
Each ￿rm f sells its di⁄erentiated output Yf;t in both domestic and foreign markets under
monopolistic competition, and there is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price
contracts ￿ la Calvo (1983). Accordingly, ￿rm f receives permission to optimally reset
prices in a given period t with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Each ￿rm f receiving permission to












Here, ￿t;t+k is the ￿rm￿ s discount rate while Df;t = PH;f;t Yf;t ￿ MCt Yf;t are period-t
nominal pro￿ts yielded. Hence, we obtain the following ￿rst-order condition characterizing















This expression states that in those intermediate-good markets in which price contracts
are re-optimised, where the newly set price is denoted by ~ PH;f;t;these are set so as to equate
the ￿rms￿discounted sum of expected revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal
cost. In the absence of price staggering (￿ = 0), the factor ￿=(￿ ￿1) represents the markup
of the price charged in domestic markets over nominal marginal cost, re￿ ecting the degree
of monopoly power on the part of the intermediate-good ￿rms.











where ￿￿ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and rest-of-the-world non-
oil consumption goods in the rest of the world. Note also that P￿
H;t = PH;t=St as the
law of one prices holds. Accordingly in equilibrium at the aggregate level, we have that
PH;tYt = PH;tHt + PH;tC￿
F;t:
3As equation (8) suggests the marginal cost is a function of ￿, the elasticity of substitution between oil
and labour. However, when log-linearising the model ￿ disappears from both the production function and
the marginal cost, although it continues to play an important role for the dynamics, as it a⁄ects the demand
for oil and labour of the primary-good ￿rm. Further to this, it also a⁄ects the non-stochastic steady-state
of the model.10
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2.3.2 Final- and Intermediate Goods
The representative ￿rm producing the non-tradable core consumption good Zt, which com-
bines purchases of a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, Ht, with pur-















where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and non-oil imports, and ￿
measures the quasi share of domestic goods in core consumption. Furthermore, we assume
that the aggregate consumption good Qt is produced by aggregating core consumption Zt
and Oc















where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between core consumption goods and oil imports, and
￿ measures the quasi share of non-oil related consumption goods in aggregate consumption.
Note that in equilibrium Qt = Ct: The corresponding price indices and individual demand
functions for (10) and (11) can be derived accordingly.
2.3.3 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor-type interest-rate rule speci￿ed in
terms of annual consumer-price in￿ ation and quarterly output growth,













where the term "R;t represents a serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock.
2.4 Aggregate Resource Constraints
Imposing market-clearing conditions implies the following aggregate resource constraint:
PH;t Yt = PC;t Ct + TBt (12)
Finally, the trade balance of the economy is de￿ned as follows:
TBt = PH;t C￿




In order to derive the empirical sign restrictions, we ￿rst log-linearise the model around
the non-stochastic steady state and then derive the theoretical impulse response functions
(IRFs) as described in the next section.11
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3 Deriving the Sign Restrictions
In this section we discuss the set of sign restrictions that we derive from the theoretical
impulse response functions of the presented model. To do this we apply the strategy dis-
cussed by Pappa (2004) and Peersman and Straub (2006) and Peersman and Straub (2008),
which requires the identi￿cation of model features that are robust to the variations of the
structural parameters up to a ￿rst-order approximation, which is a su¢ cient dimension for
deriving the sign restrictions from the VAR. In order to capture this robustness we de￿ne
in the ￿rst step a sensible range for the structural parameter values. Certain parameter val-
ues, however, we calibrate from the start. We assume that in the steady-state, net exports
are around 2% of GDP. Furthermore, the share of domestic intermediate goods in GDP
is around 0.8. Also, based on US data, we calibrate the share of oil in the consumption
basket ￿ to be 0.04. The intensity in oil value added in the production function $ equals
0.02, while the elasticity of substitution between domestic intermediate goods is set to 9.
We allow for key structural parameters, which are important for the dynamics of the
model to take a broad range of values in order to ensure that our results are robust across
a wide range. For example, the preference parameter driving the labor supply utility ￿ is
allowed to vary in the interval [0;10], the risk averse coe¢ cient ￿ 2 [1;10] and the Calvo
parameters determining the degree of nominal wage and price rigidities ￿p are allowed to
vary in the interval [0:01;0:95]: For the monetary policy rule, we delimit the range of
parameters to cover the values generally discussed in the Taylor-rule literature. To ensure
determinacy of the model, we restrict the in￿ ation response to the range between [1;3] while
the output response and the degree of interest rate smoothing are allowed to vary in the
interval [0;1].
We set the range for the subjective discount rate ￿ between [0:985; 0:995] implying an
annual steady-state real interest rate between 2 and 6 percent. The interval determining
the elasticity of substitution between labour an oil ￿ is set between [0:2; 0:5]. We also allow
the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and non-oil imports ￿ 2 [0:01; 0:05]
and the substitution between core consumption goods and oil imports ￿ 2 [1;10]: That is,
we assume, in line with the empirical literature, that core consumption and oil imports are
complements, while foreign and domestic consumption goods are substitutes. Finally, and
in line with the empirical literature, we restrict the persistence of the shocks to the interval
[0:5;0:99]: The chosen intervals are also reported in Table 1.
In the next step, we assume that the structural parameters are uniformly distributed
over the selected parameter range and draw a random value for each parameter from the
presented intervals and calculate the corresponding impulse response functions of the model.
This exercise is repeated for 500,000 simulations. The median, 84th and 16th percentiles of
all the conditional responses are shown in Figure 1.12
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Table 1: Parameter values and ranges
Parameter Description Range
￿ discount factor [0:985;0:995]
￿ risk aversion coe¢ cient [1;10]
￿ labour supply elasticity [0;10]
￿ degree of monopolistic competition in the goods market 9
￿ degree of nominal rigidities in the goods market [0:5;0:95]
￿ elasticity of substitution between labour an oil [0:1;0:6]
￿ substitution between domestic goods and non-oil imports [1;10]
￿;￿￿ substitution between core consumption goods and oil imports [0:01;0:99]
￿y coe¢ cient on output growth in the monetary policy rule [0;1]
$ quasi-share of oil in the production function 0:02
￿ quasi-share of oil in the consumption function 0:04
￿ quasi-share of foreign imports in the core consumption 0:2
￿￿ coe¢ cient on in￿ ation in the monetary policy rule [1;3]
￿r degree of interest rate smoothing [0;1]
￿ persistence of shocks [0:5;0:99]
We use the information from Figure 1 to derive theoretical IRFs which we detail in Table
2, and which we will later use to uniquely derive the sign restrictions for the VAR analysis.
In what follows, we de￿ne an expansionary shock as a shock that induces a positive reaction
on output.
In our model, and in line with the literature, technology shocks induce a negative cor-
relation between output and prices. This is in contrast to demand-side shocks, such as
government spending, preference or monetary policy shocks4. In order to di⁄erentiate be-
tween technology and oil-price shocks, we use the response of relative oil-prices, de￿ned
in the model as the ratio of oil prices over CPI. In particular, the IRFs indicate that the
reaction of relative oil-prices is positive following an expansionary technology shock and
negative following an expansionary oil price shock. The latter restriction implies that the
transmission of an oil-price shock to US CPI is not immediate, so that the oil-price falls
on impact more than the domestic price-level. We are able to di⁄erentiate between a real
and a nominal demand shock through the e⁄ects these shocks have on the interest rate.
An expansionary monetary policy shock implies a reduction of the interest rate, while a
preference shock leads to its increase.
Table 2: Theoretical Impulse Response Functions
output in￿ ation interest rate poil-p
Technology shock " # "
Oil-price shock " # #
Preference " " "
Monetary policy " " #
4Note that the terminology of a demand shock is not entirely correct in a DSGE set up, as for example
preference shocks also induce supply side adjustment (e.g. through wealth e⁄ect). That being said, we apply
the terminology of "demand side shocks" to all shock that induce, at least for a wide range of parameters,
a positive correlation between output and prices, while demand side shock are assumed to imply a negative
correlation of the latter.13
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Figure 1: Theoretical Impulse Response Functions
The IRFs in Figure 1 allow us to identify shocks in the empirical exercise using a
minimum set of sign restrictions. Most importantly, although we base our sign restriction
identi￿cation strategy on the predictions of a theoretical model, we do not have to restrict
the response of the current account and the real exchange rate, the main variables of interest.
In this respect, we can let the data speak for itself. In the next section, we describe in detail
the empirical model.
4 Empirical Model
Heated debate about the policies the US could and should take in order to help correct the
continuous deterioration of the current account have animated both academic and policy
circles. These debates have given rise to much disagreement over appropriate policy solu-
tions mainly because there is no consensus about what led the de￿cit to become so large in
the ￿rst place. It is plausible, however, that the drivers of the current account deterioration
are more complex than those pertaining to just one group and are indeed a combination of
market forces and government policies. In setting up our empirical model, we introduced a
variety of variables that could help us capture the e⁄ects of policy developments as well as
those of factors such as oil price shocks.
This section is split in two. The ￿rst part explains in further detail the restrictions
and how we used them in the empirical model for shock identi￿cation, while the second
describes the methodology.14
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4.1 Restrictions
We estimate a structural VAR using sign restrictions as in Canova and de Nicol￿ (2002). We
base our sign restrictions on the theoretical IRFs derived from the DSGE model presented
in the previous section. In what follows, we will discuss in more detail the restrictions that
we impose in our identi￿cation strategy.
As described before, the restrictions on the oil price imply that a decline (rise) in the
oil price expands (contracts) output and decreases (increases) the price of oil more than it
lowers (raises) the general price level. Note that in what follows, we present a contractionary
oil shock. Therefore, in order to make the distinction clear between this and a supply shock
we present a negative supply shock by restricting the shock to a⁄ect the general price level
more that it does the oil price. The restrictions identifying the monetary policy shock are
standard and widely accepted in the sense that a expansionary shock causes a drop in the
interest rate as well as an increase in output and prices.
Furthermore, we also identify the impact of a private absorption shock on the variables
in the model. Note that an increase in private absorption, for example caused by a change
in the time preference rate, is considered to be one of the most important drivers of the US
current account in recent years. For the latter, we use the restriction that an expansionary
private absorption shock leads, in contrast to a monetary policy shock, to a rise in the
policy interest rates, as they generally lead to a rise in output and prices. The latter
restriction is su¢ cient to disentangle a private absorption shock from a monetary policy
shock. However, in order to ensure that the rise in demand is indeed triggered by a change
in private consumption and investment, we need to impose a further restriction. In a
DSGE world, the latter shock could be seen as a joint preference shock and a potential
decline in investment adjustment costs, as discussed for example in Smets and Wouters
(2000), leading in an open economy set-up to a rise in imports and prices, but having, due
to capacity constraints, a limited impact on domestic output. In this respect, we follow
Peersman and Straub (2007) and implement restrictions on consumption and investment
relative to output. More speci￿cally we assume that a private absorption shock will increase
consumption and investment more than it will increase output and therefore enlarges the gap
between the private absorption measure (c+i) and output. Note that a private absorption
shock has a di⁄erent impact than an expansionary government spending shock, as the latter
would be expected to lead to a fall in the private absorption to output ratio, independent
of whether crowding out of private consumption and/or investment takes place or not (see
Peersman and Straub, 2007 for details).
Table 3: Empirical Sign Restrictions
output in￿ ation interest rate poil-p (c+i)-y
Technology Shock " # #
Oil-Price Shock " # "
Private Absorption Shock " " " "
Monetary Policy Shock " " #15
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4.2 VAR
Moving on to the methodology, the structural VAR model includes 7 variables, namely
output, in￿ ation, interest rate, oil price in￿ ation, the ratio of the current account to GDP,
the sum of consumption and investment (which following the literature, we labelled as
private absorption) and the real e⁄ective exchange rate. Grouping these seven variables in
yt we can show the structural model as follows:
Byt = A(L)yt￿1 + ￿t
Thus the reduced form can be re-arranged as below:
yt = B￿1A(L) + vt
where vt = B￿1￿t is the residual of the reduced form model. The key step in applying
the VAR methodology lies in identifying structural disturbances which have an economic
meaning out of the information contained in the reduced form residuals. Therefore, to
obtain estimates of ￿t given values of the estimated residuals vt we follow Canova and de
Nicol￿ (2002) who rather than impose zero restrictions on VAR coe¢ cients (Sims, 1980) or
on long-term impulse responses (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) use sign restrictions on the
cross-correlation function of variables￿responses to particular shocks. For convenience, we
depart slightly from their methodology and impose restrictions on the impact coe¢ cients
and the IRFs rather than the cross-correlation function of the impulse responses. However
this should lead to the same results5.




t) which can be rewritten in terms of the underlying shocks as P
v = E(B￿1￿t(B￿1￿t)0) = B￿1E(￿t￿0
t)(B￿1)0 = AA0 since E(￿t￿0
t) = I by assumption.
One way to decompose the var-cov matrix in the form applied here, is to break it down
in eigenvalues (V) and eigenvectors (P) such that
P
v = PV P0 = AA0. Although the
eigenvectors-eigenvalues decomposition does not have any economic meaning, by incor-
porating the theoretical restrictions we attach economic interpretations to the identi￿ed
shocks. This decomposition has the advantage of generating orthonormal shocks which
makes the value of P unique for each variance-covariance matrix decomposition without
imposing any zero restrictions. The only restrictions made so far are that the shocks should
be independent from one another and that their variance is the identity matrix. Although






If the sign restrictions from Table 3 are met we retain the decomposition and move
on to consider the orthonormal decompositions in order to provide alternative candidate
structural shocks. We do this by using a rotational matrix J of the following form:
5This is particularly obvious when restrictions are imposed only at time zero and output￿ s response is
required to be positive. The impact coe¢ cients are in fact the values that the impulse response function
takes at time 0 so imposing a restriction on the impact coe¢ cients or on the ￿rst period of the impulse
response function is the same. Also, if output is restricted to go up following a particular shock, imposing
a negative cross correlation restriction between output and prices is the same as imposing a restriction for
prices to go down following this shock.16
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1 0 ::: 0 0
0 cos(￿) ::: ￿sin(￿) 0
::: ::: 1 ::: :::
0 sin(￿) ::: cos(￿) 0





where i and j represent the rows which are being rotated, while ￿ is the rotation angle. In a
7 variable model the number of orthonormal rotational matrices is large. We construct an
algorithm covering all possible bivariate rotations, combinations of bivariate rotations by
one angle as well as by two and three angles. For more details on this please see Appendix
1. We implement all of these in our model and are able to identify simultaneously four
shocks, namely a supply, oil, monetary and private absorption shock.
Our algorithm follows Canova and de Nicol￿ (2002) with two exceptions. First we
consider three rotational angles and second rather than using an angle grid we perform a
random draw for each angle. This works in three steps. First we make 4000 random draws
for each rotation angle ￿1; ￿2 and ￿3 from the interval [0;￿]. For each combination of angles
we use the sign of the impact coe¢ cients at time 0 to identify orthonormal shocks. Among
these we pick the ones that are consistent with the restrictions presented in Table 1 and
discarding the rest. An important di⁄erence between our paper and the existing literature
that identi￿es a large number of shocks using sign restrictions is that we impose that all
restrictions are met simultaneously.
In estimating impulse responses we take into account both data and identi￿cation un-
certainty. We do this by bootstrapping the estimated residuals of the reduced form VAR,
recalculating the variance covariance matrix and re-running the VAR for each draw.
5 Empirical Results
There are three main types of results that we report in this paper. Firstly we look at the
e⁄ects of a one time shock on our variables, namely the impulse responses. Secondly, we
discuss the historical decomposition of the current account. While impulse response func-
tions provide information about the average e⁄ect of a one time shock on our variables, the
historical decomposition looks at the cumulative in￿ uence of all shocks on these variables.
Hence, in order to assess the relative importance of all disturbances on the current account
and how this has evolved over time, we move away from impulse responses and look into
the historical decomposition. Thirdly, we look at the relative importance of each shock at
di⁄erent time horizons, namely at the forecast error variance decomposition. As previously
discussed, the impulse response functions indicate the impact of an isolated shock of unit
variance at one point in time on each variable, whilst the variance decomposition combines
the information in the variances of the shocks with that from the impulse responses, in
order to describe their relative contributions to the forecast error.
5.1 Impulse Response Functions
5.1.1 Impulse Responses to Supply and Oil Price Shocks
The second column in Figure 2 shows the response of each of our variables to an oil price
shock. We assume that the oil price increase is exogenous to the US and could be caused17
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Figure 2: IRFs following Oil and Supply Shocks
by either an adverse oil supply shock in the oil exporting countries or an increase in foreign
oil demand. In our case, a contractionary oil price shock increases the price of oil by more
than it raises the general price level while having a negative e⁄ect on output. Its e⁄ect on
the current account is negative for the ￿rst two years before it becomes positive for some
time after. Results in the empirical literature are broadly supportive, but are sensitive to
the methodology used. Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2007) for instance, using a di⁄erent
procedure, ￿nd that following an increase in the oil speci￿c demand or the foreign aggregate
demand, the US current account goes into de￿cit initially but goes into a signi￿cant trade
surplus after three years.
Results in the theoretical literature seem to be sensitive to whether the model assumes
complete markets. For example, Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerriri (2007), using a two country
DSGE model, ￿nd that under incomplete markets higher oil prices decrease the wealth of
an oil importing country, inducing its non-oil terms of trade to improve and the oil trade
balance to deteriorate. The timing and magnitude of the deterioration or improvement
depend in their model on the assumption of incomplete markets.
The ￿rst column in Figure 2 displays the e⁄ects of a negative supply shock. Output
decreases on impact and stays persistently below zero for a long period. As the price level
increases, US goods become less competitive, which has an adverse e⁄ect on the current
account and the REER which appreciates.18
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Figure 3: IRFs following Monetary Policy and Private Absorption Shocks
5.1.2 Monetary and Private Absorption Shocks
The ￿rst column in Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. An
expansionary monetary shock is one that decreases nominal interest rates while expanding
both output and prices. We left the current account response to this shock unconstrained
in order to let the data speak and found that the current account￿ s response is negative
and fairly persistent. This is in line with the ￿income absorption e⁄ect￿ theory which
says that an increase in domestic income following an expansionary monetary policy shock
increases domestic import demand, which leads to a deterioration of the current account.
The subsequent convergence to equilibrium of the CA could be reinforced by the persistent
depreciation of the REER which will make domestic goods more attractive than foreign
ones. The current account may also deteriorate due to an increase in private investment
following the interest rate reduction. Kim (2001) ￿nds a similar impact on the current
account but only in the short run. Our results are also in line with those of Bems, Dedola
and Smets (2007) who also ￿nd a signi￿cant deterioration of the current account following
an expansionary monetary policy shock.
We also left the response of the REER unconstrained and found that this depreciates
slowly and persistently after an expansionary monetary shock. The maximum impact of
the shock does not occur contemporaneously but after 2 years. Although this result is
inconsistent with the standard theoretical overshooting models6, it is line with the classical
6In these models (e.g. Dornbusch 1976) an expansionary monetary policy generates a large initial depre-
ciation of the REER followed by a subsequent appreciation.19
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empirical work (e.g. Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995) as well as with the one using sign
restrictions (e.g. Scholl and Uhlig, 2008).
The private absorption shock is an aggregate demand shock that increases output, prices
and the interest rate as well as private investment and consumption. The e⁄ect on the cur-
rent account is persistently negative and is in line with most of the empirical and theoretical
literature on this topic.
5.2 Historical Decomposition of the Current Account
In order to assess the relative importance of all disturbances on the current account and how
this has evolved over time, we need to move away from impulse responses and look into the
historical decomposition of the current account. Therefore the next question that we pose
is to what extent do the ￿ve shocks we identify explain the ups and downs of the US current
account. In order to do this, we di⁄erentiate between the evolution of the current account
explained by the variables of our model and that explained by the structural disturbances.
In other words we calculate the baseline projection, which mirrors the level of the current
account that would have been achieved if no shocks were present and the cumulative sum
of all the aggregate demand, the supply and oil price shocks across time. Therefore the
actual level of the current account is given by the sum of the baseline projections made at
the beginning of the period and the combined e⁄ect of shocks that hit the current account
thereafter. If economic agents were to make a forecast based on the information they had
at the beginning of the period (base point), namely the structure of the empirical model
and the value of the VAR parameters, they would be correct up to the shocks.
The choice of base point is very important because agents are assumed to know every-
thing up to the time of the base point, including the shocks which previously hit the current
account, therefore the deviation of the baseline from the actual series is given only by the
shocks which occur after the projection is made. This is important particularly since there
could be a persistent shock hitting the economy before the base point which would be in-
cluded in the base forecast but not surface amongst the shocks which make the base forecast
deviate from the actual series thereafter.
In order to perform the historical decomposition, we split this analysis in three parts as
presented in Figure 4. The ￿rst covers the years between 1970 and 1980 and was character-
ized generally by a balanced evolution of the current account. This period saw the oil price
increase in 1973 and 1974 and the Yom Kippur war in 1973. It also just covers the Iranian
revolution in 1979 and the 1979-1980 increase in the oil price.
The second period starts in 1980 and goes all the way to 1997, covering a period of both
current account deterioration and improvement. We chose to start this time window in
1980 for several reasons. The early 1980s was characterized by a world wide liberalization
of goods, ￿nancial and services markets which made it easier for domestic ￿rms to ￿nance
investment and saving abroad and by starting our window in 1980 we hoped to capture the
e⁄ects of these changes on the current account. Moreover, Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000)
point out that Volcker￿ s appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board at the end
of 1979 changed the way monetary policy was implemented. Other authors, believe that
more generally the structure of the US economy has changed since the 1980s as either shocks
hitting the economy have changed or their e⁄ect on the economy has changed7. We run
7There is a large literature which analyses the potential chance in structure of the US economy, par-
ticularly the one dealing with the so called great moderation. See for example Benati and Surico (2007),
Primiceri and Justiniano (2006) and Bilbiie and Straub (2007).20
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Figure 4: U.S. current account as share of GDP
this period until 1997 as it seems that during this period the current account still displayed
some mean reversal properties.
The last period from 1998 to 2006 covers the longest and sharpest current account
deterioration in US history. This includes the two oil price increases of 1999 and 20038 and
the historically low interest rate environment of 2003 and 2004. In what follows and for
the reasons explained above, we chose as base starts 1970, 1980 and 1997. The historical
decomposition of the ￿rst period is presented in Figure 5.
8For a detailed account of oil price increases and how they ￿t amongs macroeconomic events between
1960 and 2005 see Blanchard and Gali (2007).21
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Figure 5 : Contribution of shocks to deviation from baseline- 1970-1979
The 10 year period between 1970 and 1980 was a period of relative calm for the current
account. During this period monetary shocks proved relatively more important, particularly
from mid 1973 to the end of 1976. We do not ￿nd that the oil price increase in 1973 had
a signi￿cant negative in￿ uence on the current account, a fact which is perhaps not very
surprising since other authors (e.g. Blanchard and Gali, 2007) came to the same conclusion
with respect to the decline of output and increase of in￿ ation during that period.
Figure 6 shows the historical decomposition from 1980 to the end of 1996. The most
important thing to notice about this period is that the private absorption and monetary
shocks have been more important for the negative evolution of the current account than
all other shocks. More speci￿cally it seems that the monetary shock is the most important
factor in explaining the deterioration of the current account in the ￿rst half of the 1980s.
The improvement that followed in the second half of the 1980s was driven in part by supply
shocks. The subsequent deterioration at the beginning of the 1990s seems to have been22
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driven in part by a combination of monetary, private absorption and oil price shocks.
Figure 6 : Contribution of shocks to deviation from baseline- 1980-1996
The historical decomposition of the third and last period covering 1997 up to 2006 is
presented in Figure 7. During this period monetary policy has been accommodative with
relatively low interest rates while ￿scal policy has been loosened particularly since 2001
with the aim of encouraging private savings. Oil prices have started going up particularly
strongly since 2003, a fact that is believed by some to have had a role in the deterioration
of the current account.23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 959
November 2008
Figure 7 : Contribution of shocks to deviation from baseline- 1997-2006
The historical decomposition in Figure 7 picks up on the general loose monetary policy
of the early years from 2000 and re￿ ects it in a negative in￿ uence on the current account.
This negative in￿ uence is reinforced in 2002 by the negative in￿ uence of the supply shock.
Given the importance of the link between the evolution of the current account and the
REER, we also brie￿ y looked at the historical decomposition of the REER using the same
breakdown of the sample as for the current account. We performed this exercise mainly
to give us a ￿ avour for whether the current account and REER￿ s movements are driven by
common factors. We found that the monetary policy and the private absorption shocks are
still the dominant forces behind the deviation of the REER from the base line projection.
We present the graphs for the historical decomposition of the REER in the Appendix 3.
5.3 Forecast error variance decomposition
The variance decomposition provides information about how important one shock is relative
to others in explaining the variance of the current account. In our case, it points out what
percentage of the variance of the current account is explained by the supply shock, oil
price shock, monetary policy shock and private absorption shock. Table 4 summarises these
percentages for selected years and shows that at di⁄erent forecast horizons the oil price
shock explains a steady proportion of the total variance of the current account at around 9
percent. The private absorption shock explains as little as 11 percent of the variance of the
current account at a 1 year forecast horizon, but steadily grows and settles at around 25
percent at a seven year forecast horizon. The monetary shock has the highest in￿ uence of
cc. 62 percent at low forecast horizons although this gradually reduces to roughly 41 percent
at a 7 year forecast horizon. In conclusion, at di⁄erent forecast horizons the four shocks24
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taken together explain over 80 percent of the variance of the current account, illustrating
that whilst these may not be responsible for the entire deterioration of the current account
they still explain a relatively high proportion of its variability.
Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the US CA
Years Supply Shock Oil Shock Monetary Shock Private Absorption Shock
1 15.3 9.1 62.5 10.6
3 12.8 6.7 53.1 16.4
5 9.8 6.8 43.9 24.8
7 7.6 9.7 41.3 25.8
6 Conclusion
We estimated a 7 variable structural VAR using data on US output, in￿ ation, interest rate,
oil in￿ ation, current account, private absorption and the real e⁄ective exchange rate. We
use sign restrictions derived from a DSGE model with oil to simultaneously identify four real
and nominal shocks. The impulse response functions suggest that a contractionary oil price
shock has a negative e⁄ect on the current account which lasts for approximately 3 years.
This is broadly in line with the empirical literature. Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2007) for
instance, ￿nd that following an increase in the oil speci￿c demand or the foreign aggregate
demand, the US current account goes into de￿cit initially but goes into a signi￿cant trade
surplus after three years.
We also presented results about the main drivers of current account ￿ uctuations in the
US For this, we split the data set into three parts. The common feature of the analysis is
that expansionary monetary policy shocks as well as positive private absorption shocks were
the main drivers of current account deterioration in all three periods. Note, however, that
the e⁄ect of private absorption shocks are much more persistent. Bems, Dedola and Smets
(2007) ￿nd that although ￿scal and monetary policy shocks as well as supply shocks have
been driving the US CA deterioration before the 1990s only the ￿scal and monetary policy
shocks plays some role, although small, during the decade that followed. The di⁄erence in
the importance of supply shocks from our paper could be due to the fact that they do not
account for oil price shocks separately. Also, the importance of the monetary shock could
be larger in our paper due to the fact that we do not identify shocks such as ￿scal shocks
that are possible to have been picked up by the monetary shock and thus further work in
disentangling these is required.
With regards to the forecast error variance decomposition, we showed that monetary
policy shocks explain 62% at a one year forecast horizon although this reduces to 41% at
a 7 year horizon whilst the oil price shock explains just under 10% at the same forecast
horizons. Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007) ￿nd a smaller contribution of the monetary
policy shock to the forecast error variance of the net trade/GDP ratio ranging between 8
and 12% at business cycle frequencies. Again, this di⁄erence could come from the di⁄erent
methodologies and variables in the VAR that we are using. However, overall we do ￿nd
that monetary policy shocks have played an important role in the US CA deterioration over
time, a conclusion which is also shared by their paper.
One interesting extension of the current paper could be to di⁄erentiate the impact of
endogenous and exogenous oil price shocks on the US current account as in Kilian, Rebucci
and Spatafora (2007). Endogenous oil price shocks could be de￿ned thereby as oil price25
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hikes that are the consequences of World GDP growth, while exogenous oil price shocks are
de￿ned to be created in the oil market itself. Also, we have neglected in our analysis some
other prominent shocks that are contemplated as a driver of current account ￿ uctuations.
A good example of such shocks is an expansionary ￿scal policy shock. In order to assess
the importance of the omitted shocks, we would need to identify additional shocks in our
VAR, which poses some challenges to the applied sign restrictions methodology9. We leave
that, however, for future research.
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Appendix 1: Example of Rotational Matrices
Bivariate Rotation: rotate two variables while keeping the other two ￿xed. Below







cos(￿) ￿sin(￿) 0 0 0 0 0
sin(￿) cos(￿) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0







Combination of Bivariate Rotations using one angle, ￿: rotate two variables by
￿ while rotating the other two by the same angle while keeping the orthogonality condition
still satis￿ed. The matrix below depicts an example when the ￿rst and the third row are









cos(￿) 0 ￿sin(￿) 0 0 0 0
0 cos(￿) 0 ￿sin(￿) 0 0 0
sin(￿) 0 cos(￿) 0 0 0 0
0 sin(￿) 0 cos(￿) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0








Combination of Bivariate Rotations using two angles, ￿ and ￿1: rotate two
variables by ￿ while rotating the other two by ￿1 preserving the orthogonality condition.
For any size VAR there will be an in￿nite number of rotations given by the fact that for
each ￿ we can rotate the other two variables by any angle ￿1. To reduce the in￿nite problem
to an accountable one, we choose ￿ and ￿1 from the interval (0,
￿
2
) by fractionating it into
100 points for each angle. Below we reproduce the previous example but rotate the second









cos(￿) 0 ￿sin(￿) 0 0 0 0
0 cos(￿1) 0 ￿sin(￿1) 0 0 0
sin(￿) 0 cos(￿) 0 0 0 0
0 sin(￿1) 0 cos(￿1) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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Combination of Bivariate Rotations using three angles, ￿, ￿1 and ￿2: rotate
two variables by ￿ while rotating two others by ￿1 and two others by ￿2 preserving the
orthogonality condition. As above, for any size VAR there will be an in￿nite number of
rotations of this type. To reduce the in￿nite problem to an accountable one, we choose ￿, ￿1
and ￿2 from the interval (0,
￿
2
) by fractionating it into 100 points for each angle. Below we
reproduce the previous example but now rotate the remainder of the variables by a di⁄erent








cos(￿) 0 ￿sin(￿) 0 0 0 0
0 cos(￿1) 0 ￿sin(￿1) 0 0 0
sin(￿) 0 cos(￿) 0 0 0 0
0 sin(￿1) 0 cos(￿1) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 cos(￿2) ￿sin(￿2)
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Appendix 2: Data
We use quarterly data starting in 1970 Q1 and ￿nishing in 2006 Q4. GDP, consumption
and investment are used in logs while the CPI index and oil prices are used in log di⁄erences.
The interest rate and the REER are used in original form.
Appendix 3: Historical Decomposition of the US REER
Figure 1A : Contribution of shocks to deviation of REER from baseline- 1970-197930
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Figure 2A :Contribution of shocks to deviation of REER from baseline- 1980-1996
Figure 3 : Contribution of shocks to deviation of REER from baseline- 1996-200631
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